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"Cool Reflexion" and the Criticism of Values: 
Is, Ought, and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science 
STEPHEN G. SALKEVER 
Bryn Mawr College 
Is the fact/value distinction incompatible with the possibility of a social science which is both 
objective and evaluative (or normative)? Does support of the latter require rejection of the former 
and vice versa? This article presents an indirect argument against the incompatibility of the 
fact/value distinction and an objectively evaluative social science. My procedure is to show that 
David Hume, whose is/ought distinction is the locus classicus of the fact/value distinction, is 
committed both to the view that values cannot be derived from facts and to the view that social 
science is not (and should not be) value-neutral. Furthermore, Hume's position is free from any 
logical flaws. My conclusion is that it is false to say that the fact/value distinction entails a 
value-neutral social science, and that it is therefore utterly unnecessary for critics of such a science 
to waste their time attempting to "bridge the gap" between facts and values. 
Perhaps the most powerful, and surely the 
most famous, argument for the exclusion of 
moral predicates from social scientific discus- 
sion is contained in David Hume's is/ought 
distinction, which occurs in A Treatise of 
Human Nature (pp. 469-70). In this much- 
disputed passage, Hume appears to claim that 
ought propositions cannot be deduced from is 
propositions, and that it is therefore a logical 
error to claim that moral distinctions or judg- 
ments can be derived from reason. The question 
is this: does Hume's "celebrated observation" 
(Hare, 1964, p. 29) that ought cannot be 
deduced from is require the conclusion that 
ought propositions are not subject to criticism 
and revision on rational grounds (in the way 
that descriptive or explanatory propositions 
may be criticized) and so must be excluded 
from any objective and rigorous social science? 
My argument will be that Hume does not draw 
this conclusion, and that his rejection of value- 
neutrality as a goal of social science is not 
inconsistent with his rejection on logical 
grounds of the deduction of ought from is, of 
value from fact. 
One further preliminary distinction is re- 
quired here: in speaking of Hume's implicit 
criticism of value-neutrality I am not claiming, 
for Hume or in general, that objectivity is 
enhanced insofar as the social scientist holds 
certain values at the outset of his or her inquiry 
(Miller, 1979). Rather, my contention is that 
the conclusion of such inquiry will be the 
evaluation or criticism of values, rather than the 
description or explanation of moral and cul- 
tural judgments in value-neutral terms (see 
Gibson, 1977). 
The is/ought passage itself has been, in the 
last 20 years, the object of as much close 
analysis as the most obscure classical text.1 
Although on first inspection "Hume's "Guillo- 
tine" seems to bring about a clean separation 
between facts and values, a closer look reveals 
ambiguities. The interpretive difficulties arise 
when Hume says that it "seems altogether 
inconceivable, how this new relation [the ought 
proposition] can be a deduction from others [is 
propositions] which are entirely different from 
it" (Black, 1969, p. 100, emphasis added). 
When Hume says that such a deduction "seems 
altogether inconceivable," is he ironically ex- 
pressing the view that it really is inconceivable, 
or only stating a difficult problem to be solved 
by the rest of book 3 of the Treatise? And 
when he says "deduction," does he mean strict 
logical entailment (in which case some other 
form of inference from fact to value might be 
possible) or any inference whatsoever (in which 
case the gap between fact and value would be 
absolutely unbridgeable)? Furthermore, how 
radical is the break with earlier moral and 
political philosophy proposed by the is/ought 
distinction? In the same paragraph, Hume says 
that he is both exposing a defect in "every 
system of morality" and that his distinction 
"wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morali- 
ty"; that these expressions are not synonymous 
is suggested by Hume's frequent separation of 
learned and vulgar judgments.2 
1The first important demonstration of the difficul- 
ties that emerge from a careful reading of the passage 
was that of McIntyre (1969), to whom my own 
discussion of Hume owes a great deal. 
20ne possible resolution of this difficulty would be 
to suggest that Hume was opposed to all "systems" in 
science, on the grounds that they distorted our view of 
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The meaning of the is/ought passage is of 
more than simply exegetical concern insofar as 
it squarely raises the issue of whether Hume's 
distinction can be used as a warrant for 
claiming that values or moral propositions 
(unlike factual beliefs) are not subject to 
rational defense or criticism. If so, then such 
propositions should be excluded from that 
"science of man" (Treatise, p. xxii) whose 
foundation on an objective basis forms the goal 
of the Treatise as a whole. Since the disputed 
passage is not self-explanatory, any attempt to 
deal with this question must look beyond it to 
Hume's own practice of social science in book 
3. 
Hume's Practice of Social Science 
Many of Hume's most famous logical and 
psychological doctrines and aphorisms suggest 
the conclusion that moral judgments are not 
susceptible of rational evaluation. Moral judg- 
ments are constituted by a feeling or sentiment, 
and are not conclusions of reason (Treatise, pp. 
471, 457). Reasoning is always subsequent to a 
determination of the passions, and so can never 
judge them: "Reason is, and ought only to be 
the slave of the passions" (Treatise, p. 415). 
Actions, which are to be construed as reflec- 
tions of moral principles, can be called laudable 
or blameworthy, "but they cannot be reason- 
able or unreasonable" (Treatise, pp. 477, 458). 
Passionate preferences appear to be similarly 
closed to rational critique: " 'Tis not contrary 
to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole 
world to the scratching of my finger" (Treatise, 
p. 416). All this suggests that it would be 
plausible to attribute to Humne a sort of 
pre-Stevensonian emotivism,3 and to conclude 
that while social science may indeed explain 
and classify moral judgments it should avoid 
the inappropriate evaluation of such judgments 
the evidence (An Inquiry Conceming the Principles of 
Morals, p. 8), a view which was almost a commonplace 
in eighteenth-century discussions of science. (For a 
discussion of a similarly critical response to "system" 
in Rousseau and Buffon, see Salkever, 1978, pp. 
216-17.) However, since Hume does refer to his own 
work as a "system of .ethics" (Treatise, p. 618), this 
resolution does not agree precisely with every instance 
of Hume's use of the term. 
3This is proposed by Flew (1969, p. 67). Ardal 
(1966, p. 212) argues that while Hume is not strictly 
speaking an emotivist (since he was not specifically 
concerned with the nature of moral utterance), emo- 
tivism is "in conformity with other aspects of his 
philosophy." 
in terms of their rationality. 
Nevertheless, the bulk of Hume's social 
science in book 3 of the Treatise is as much 
concerned with justification and evaluation as it 
is with the explanation of moral phenomena. 
Hume does of course spend a good deal of time 
explaining how human beings come to have 
those peculiar sensations which we call praise 
and blame; this explanation revolves around his 
account of the process of communicated affec- 
tions which he calls sympathy (Treatise, p. 
576). But he also wants to answer the substan- 
tive moral question of what virtue (and parti- 
cularly, justice) is, as well as the psychological 
question of how we come to call certain 
phenomena (or characters) virtuous or vicious. 
Justice, according to Hume, is defined by 
the three fundamental laws of stability of 
possession, translation by consent, and the 
performance of promises (Treatise, p. 541). His 
argument that this conception of justice can be 
justified by reference to a particular conception 
of the facts which constitute the human condi- 
tion and general human interest is too well 
known to require extensive summary here (see 
McIntyre, 1969, pp. 39-42). The basic fact or 
major premise of the argument is that human 
beings, unlike any other animals, are creatures 
of numberless needs and slender resources, and 
that it is by the conventions of social organiza- 
tion alone that man is "able to supply his 
defects" (Treatise, pp. 484-85). The gravest of 
these defects is the instability and uncertainty 
"of such possessions as we have acquir'd by our 
industry or good fortune," and it is this 
particular defect (rather than, say, our capacity 
for vice, as for Aristotle) which provides the 
problem to which the conventions of society 
and justice are the solution (Treatise, pp. 487, 
491). 
Thus far we are dealing only with Hume's 
conception of the facts, and with the process of 
reasoning or drawing inferences from one set of 
facts to another: from the defining character- 
istics of the human condition to those conven- 
tions and rules which are best suited to solving 
the problems implicit in these characteristics. 
This inference is sufficient to defend Hume's 
conception of justice as a more reasonable 
solution to the human problem than its com- 
petitors, such as the Aristotelian notion of 
justice as fitness in distribution (Treatise, p. 
502), but it is not sufficient to attach a sense of 
moral obligation or a sentiment of duty to the 
rules of Humean justice. One may, without 
self-contradiction, accept the argument and still 
not feel any obligation to abstain from the 
property of others or to keep one's promises: 
"We have no motive leading us to the perfor- 
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mance of promises distinct from a sense of 
duty" (Treatise, p. 518).4 If Iremain unmoved 
by the prospect of enhancing the general 
interest of mankind, no amount of careful 
inductive inference can cause me to feel a duty 
to enhance that interest. However, once the 
connection between interest and justice is 
established, Hume does believe that the natural 
operations of sympathy, combined with par- 
ental instruction and political education, will in 
most cases add a sense of moral obligation to 
those rules for which political philosophy and 
social science (which are one and the same for 
Hume) provide the justification (Treatise, pp. 
533-34).5 But these are two separate pro- 
cesses: social science can show the causal link 
between a particular conception of justice and 
human interest, but this demonstration cannot 
by itself compel moral (or action-guiding) 
assent to its conclusions. I may well agree that 
promise-keeping is in the interest of mankind 
and yet feel no moral obligation to keep 
promises to people I dislike without in any way 
contradicting myself. My deficiency is in 
sympathy, not reason. Justice is a means to an 
end, and will be valued or desired only insofar 
as the end is valued (Treatise, p. 619). 
Thus for Hume social science is limited in 
that it cannot compel moral assent, a limitation 
which can be established on both logical and 
psychological grounds. But it is not at all 
irrelevant to morality, or limited to describing 
the development of moral sentiments, since its 
conclusions provide either criticism or justifica- 
tion of those principles or values to which a 
sense of moral obligation may or may not 
become attached. It does this by showing that 
the rules of justice and society are not arbitrary 
conventions, unlike the rules of various games 
(Treatise, p. 484; An Inquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals, p. 39). Rather, they can be 
construed and evaluated as proposed solutions 
or answers to the problems posed by the 
observable and contingent facts about human 
needs, interests, and capacities. A good illustra- 
4Thus from a Humean point of view, any attempt 
to argue (as does Searle, 1969) that certain institution- 
al facts, like promising, entail obligation, is not only 
doomed to failure but utterly beside the point. 
5Hume's position here clearly resembles Aristotle's 
argument, in the Nicomachean Ethics, that a good 
moral character cannot be produced by reason alone, 
but can only emerge from a process of habituation. In 
general, my reading of Hume suggests that his account 
of the form of practical reasoning (though certainly 
not of its content) is much closer to Aristotle's than 
most (including Hume) have thought. 
tion of this procedure is Hume's discussion of 
various competing principles of political obliga- 
tion, a problem which is central to all his moral 
and political writing, in which he criticizes as 
mistaken the two extreme views of Tory passive 
obedience and Whig contractarianism and at- 
tempts to justify a more reasonable middle 
ground.6 His argument is that any acceptable 
principle of political obligation, the sort of 
principle which proposes an idea of the extent 
to which a citizen owes allegiance to govern- 
ment, must maximize the satisfaction of the 
general interest in peace and liberty and that, in 
fact, "the obligation to obedience must cease, 
whenever the interest ceases. . . ," since 
"these notions of right and obligation are 
deriv'd from nothing but the advantage we reap 
from government. . ." (Treatise, pp. 562, 553, 
555, emphasis in original). 
The function of social science is thus not 
simply to describe and explain the views people 
actually hold concerning the limits of political 
obligation and the nature of justice, but also to 
discriminate between adequate and mistaken 
conceptions relative to the standard provided 
by the facts about the human condition. Such a 
science is thus legitimately evaluative as well as 
explanatory, although it cannot by itself entail 
a sense of obligation, or somehow demonstrate 
to those without concern for general human 
welfare that they ought to have such a concern. 
Moral Judgments and Reasons: 
Hume's Distinctions 
Thus far I have argued that Hume's practice 
of social science rests on the methodological 
principle that moral and political judgments are 
criticizable on objective grounds, even though 
these judgments cannot be derived from, nor be 
entailed or required by, any facual proposi- 
tions. Moral sentiments themselves are neither 
rational nor irrational, but the principles to 
which they become attached (say, distributive 
justice or the contract theory of obligation) 
may indeed be criticized in terms of their 
rationality as solutions to the problem of 
human interest or happiness. Assuming this to 
be a fair statement of Hume's position, the 
following question remains: does Hume's prac- 
tice of a critical and evaluative social science 
contradict the separation of is and ought 
asserted in the first two sections of book 3 of 
6Forbes (1975, pp. 193-223) argues persuasively 
that moderation was the ruling passion of Hume's 
philosophical criticism of British politics. 
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the Treatise? While recognizing the dangers 
inherent in what Anthony Flew calls the 
Infallibility Assumption,7 I will attempt to 
show that Hume's argument that moral distinc- 
tions are not derived from reason is consistent 
in general, though not always in detail, with his 
implicit assumption that such distinctions are 
criticizable and corrigible on rational and objec- 
tive grounds. 
Hume offers two major arguments for the 
conclusion that moral judgments are indepen- 
dent of reason. First, morality results in action 
while reason does not; second, the terms 
"'reasonable" and "unreasonable" cannot be 
applied to actions or morals, but only to 
beliefs.8 The first argument seems to rest on a 
descriptive psychological claim, the assertion 
that as a matter of fact "morals excite passions; 
... reason of itself is utterly impotent in this 
particular" (Treatise, p. 457). Hume concludes 
from this that "the rules of morality . . . are not 
conclusions of our reason." There is nothing in 
this argument, however, to deny the view that 
moral rules, however they are arrived at in the 
first instance, may be subject to correction and 
revision in the light of subsequent reflection 
and experience. It simply says that reason by 
itself cannot constitute moral rules. This point 
is very similar to Aristotle's claim in book 6 of 
the Nicomachean Ethics (1 139a35-b4), in 
which it is argued that since "thought by itself 
moves nothing," a person cannot become vir- 
tuous simply by engaging in a certain course of 
reasoning.9 Reason may be both perfectly 
incapable of spontaneously generating morals 
and yet perfectly able to evaluate morals. 
Hume's second argument for the categorical 
separation of reason and morality is much more 
ambiguous. His basic premise here appears to be 
the logical or analytic claim that reason is 
concerned only with the agreement (or dis- 
agreement) of a belief to either "real relations 
7This is the fallacy of "insisting that where two 
passages in an author appear to be inconsistent, one of 
these passages has to be so interpreted that the 
apparent inconsistency is resolved" (Flew, 1969, p. 
65). Of course, one must also be careful to avoid the 
practice of Hubristic Restraint, which makes one's 
own good sense the measure of an author's con- 
sistency. 
8What follows is greatly indebted to the presenta- 
tion of Harrison (1976). Both arguments are de- 
veloped in concise form on pp. 457-58 of the 
Treatise. 
9This similarity is noted and exploited to a very 
different end (that of showing that Aristotle is really a 
Humean subjectivist malgre lui) by Irwin (1975). 
of ideas, or to real existence and matter of 
fact" (Treatise, p. 458, emphasis in original). 
The next step in the argument, however, is the 
psychological claim that "passions, volitions, 
and actions," which are the components and 
the objects of moral judgments, are "original 
facts and realities, compleat in themselves," and 
thus "not susceptible of any such agreement or 
disagreement" (Treatise, p. 458). The inference 
drawn from these premises is that virtue is 
neither discovered nor derived by the under- 
standing or by reason (Treatise, p. 463). Does 
this conclusion mean that moral judgments are 
absolutely incorrigible and independent of rea- 
son, as is our preference for one flavor of ice 
cream rather than another? 
Everything here seems to depend on under- 
standing what Hume means by saying that our 
passions and actions are "original facts and 
realities, compleat in themselves." It is clear 
that he does not mean that such phenomena are 
self-generating: our feelings or impressions of 
moral good and evil arise as a result of the 
interaction between the internal actions of our 
mind and external objects (Treatise, pp 
464-65). When this interaction results in a 
feeling of pleasure or pain of a particular sort 
("without reference to our particular interest" 
[Treatise, p. 472] ), we Call the feeling one of 
virtue or vice. So while it is clearly wrong to say 
that virtue can be derived from consideration of 
external objects and their relations only, it is 
equally misleading to say that virtue is a feeling 
spontaneously and independently produced by 
the passions alone. 
My pleasure in viewing a charitable or a 
courageous character derives from the complex 
interaction of my impressions of that character 
and its effects on others and the sympathetic 
pleasure which these impressions produce in 
me. The difficulty that Hume encounters in 
describing this interaction appears when at the 
end of section 1 of book 3, just prior to the 
is/ought passage, he attempts to clarify his 
conception of our feelings of virtue and vice by 
saying that they are like secondary qualities in 
modem (Lockean) philosophy and physics, 
perceptions in the mind rather than qualities in 
objects (Treatise, p. 469). The problem with 
this analogy is that Hume has already, in book 
1 (Treatise, pp. 226-31), presented very strong 
arguments against the intelligibility of the 
distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities. This inconsistency suggests a very 
serious difficulty in Hume's account of the 
nature of our moral judgments. Is there any 
Humean way around it? 
I believe that there is; it lies in noting that 
moral judgments are not, for Hume, the only 
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judgments which are internal, not derived from 
reason, and yet corrigible and subject to criti- 
cism by experience and reflection. These char- 
acteristics also apply to our judgments of 
efficient causal necessity, whose critique forms 
the subject of book 1 of the Treatise. 10 This 
analogy has been traced in detail by Lewis 
White Beck (1974), who argues that the gap 
between is and ought is, for Hume, the same as 
the gap between was and must be. Hume's 
critique of causality consists of showing that all 
causal judgments arise from two interacting 
elements: our probabilistic reasoning concern- 
ing the connections among events (Treatise, pp. 
180-8 1), and the supervenient belief that 
future events will (or "must be") connected in 
the same way that similar events have been in 
our past experience. Much of book 1 is devoted 
to an account of the conditions under which we 
come to experience causal judgments (showing 
that they are derived from custom and habit, 
rather than reason), just as much of book 3 is 
devoted to an account of the conditions under 
which we experience moral judgments 1 (show- 
ing that they are derived from sympathy, rather 
than reason). A good way of summarizing the 
similarities between causal and moral judgments 
is to note that, for Hume, both can be 
understood on the model of aesthetic apprecia- 
tion, as matters of taste (Treatise, pp. 103, 462, 
547n., 577, 581-82);Morals, p. 6). 
But to say that they are matters of taste is 
not at all to say that they are strictly subjective 
and incorrigible; there is a real (not only a 
conventional) difference between good and bad 
taste (Treatise, p. 472), and similarly a dif- 
ference between good and bad causal judg- 
ments, or between good and bad science. Book 
1 of the Treatise is by no means a blanket 
indictment of all inductive causal inference as 
unreasonable. It also contains a lengthy analysis 
of the ways in which we can correct errors in 
10Compare the language of the is/ought passage 
with the following statement on p. 134 of the 
Treatise: ". . . let men be once fully convinced of 
these two principles [that 'cause' is not in any object, 
and that there is no reason for inferring causality from 
constant conjunction, and this will throw them so 
loose from all common systems, that they will make 
no difficulty of receiving any, which may appear the 
most extraordinary." 
III think, however, that it is misleading to say, 
with Ardal (1966, p. 195), that this is Hume's "chief 
objective" in book 3. Harrison's conclusion that Hume 
was asking a moral question, rather than a psycho- 
logical or sociological one (at least, given twentieth- 
century definitions of these sciences), seems nearer the 
mark (1976, pp. 122-23). 
those probabilistic judgments to which causal 
beliefs become attached, providing a set of 
general rules of inductive method (Treatise, pp. 
173-75) by which we can "learn to distinguish 
the accidental circumstances from the effica- 
cious causes," and so avoid erroneous judg- 
ments like those expressed in the prejudices 
that "an Irishman cannot have wit, and a 
Frenchman cannot have solidity" (Treatise, pp. 
149, 146, emphasis in original).12 Although 
causal judgments are not themselves derived 
from or by reasoning, accurate and careful 
reasoning concerning those probabilistic in- 
ferences on which causal beliefs depend can 
improve the quality of those beliefs and enable 
us to reject mistaken causal systems and claims. 
Moral judgments guide conduct and are not 
derived from abstract reason; moral obligations 
are not entailed by "the discovery of certain 
connexions and relations of ideas, which are 
eternal, immutable, and universally obligatory" 
(Treatise, p. 496). But all moral judgments 
(whether "artificial" or "natural") contain or 
are supervenient on causal probabilistic claims 
that certain dispositions or characters tend to 
promote the interests of society or mankind, 
just as causal scientific claims are supervenient 
on probabilistic judgments that some events 
regularly precede other events (Treatise, p. 579; 
Beck, 1974, p. 221). Thus it makes perfect 
Humean sense to say that there can be "fatal 
errors in our conduct" and in the desires and 
moral judgments which produce that conduct 
(Treatise, p. 538). Furthermore, while reason 
alone has no power to direct our action, 
"reason -and judgment may, indeed, be the 
mediate cause of an action, by prompting, or 
by directing a passion" (Treatise, p. 462). 
This position is expressed with even greater 
clarity in the first section of the second 
Inquiry, where Hume says that even though 
reason cannot be the proximate cause of any 
action, and thus cannot take the place of moral 
sentiments, "in order to pave the way for such 
a sentiment and give a proper discernment of its 
object, it is often necessary, we find, that much 
reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions 
be made, just conclusions drawn, distant com- 
parisons formed, complicated relations ex- 
amined, and general facts fixed and ascer- 
tained" (Morals, p. 6).1 3 To say that reason is a 
12 I am guided here by Cassidy (1977). 
13See also Morals, p. 105: "Reason, when fully 
assisted and improved, is sufficient to instruct us in 
the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and 
actions, but it is not alone sufficient to produce any 
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mediate cause of conduct is surely to say much 
more than that reason is simply instrumental, 
nothing more than a calculation of the best 
means to an end independently and irrationally 
established by passion. Reasoning can ascertain 
general facts concerning human need or in- 
terest, and draw inferences concerning the 
dispositions and customs which tend to pro- 
mote this interest. Hume's social science is itself 
a critique of those practical reasonings which 
are implicit in various customs and moral 
systems, and not simply an account of the 
conditions under which such systems arise. 
There are two general classes of errors which 
can result in unsatisfactory moral judgments: 
errors concerning the basic human needs 
(which, according to Hume, are the needs for 
peace and liberty in general, and the stability of 
possessions in particular), and errors concerning 
the rules and dispositions which best satisfy 
those needs. The two great sources of both 
types of error are a priori moral systems which 
distort our view of the observable facts con- 
cerning human needs (Morals, p. 8) and our 
natural tendency to mistake judgments about 
our own interests for genuine moral judgments: 
"There is no quality in human nature, which 
causes more fatal errors in our conduct, than 
that which leads us to prefer whatever is 
present to the distant and remote, and makes us 
desire objects more according to their situation 
than their intrinsic value" (Treatise, p. 538). 
These sources of error are precisely analo- 
gous to the two sources of mistakes concerning 
inductive inferences. The first error can be 
corrected by insisting on the importance of fact 
and observation in practical reasoning, as in 
science. The second involves the question of the 
proper perspective from which moral judgments 
can be made, and is the same as the problem 
relative to "our judgments concerning external 
bodies" in natural science (Treatise, p. 603). 
Our moral judgments will be free from implicit 
errors to the extent that they are informed by a 
process of reflection which enables us to 
consider the value of characters and disposi- 
moral blame or approbation." There are important 
doubts about the propriety of using the Inquiries to 
solve interpretive difficulties in the Treatise (see Ardal, 
1966, pp. 2-3), since in many respects the Inquiries 
are intended by Hume to smooth over perplexities 
that are squarely faced in the Treatise. The elimination 
of the doctrine of sympathy from the second Inquiry 
is but one instance of this. I have tried to deal with 
these problems by citing the Inquiries only when there 
is, to my mind, clear agreement between them and the 
Treatise. 
tions from the perspective of the interests of 
mankind. A necessary condition for adequate 
reflection of this kind is the intercourse of 
sentiments in society, which is made possible 
by sympathy, and which enables us to say that 
"X is good" instead of "X pleases me" (Trea- 
tise, pp. 574-91; Beck, 1974, p. 226). Genuine 
moral judgments are not produced indepen- 
dently or spontaneously by asocial individuals, 
but emerge only in the process of expressing 
and comparing views about how best to solve 
common human problems, and to satisfy shared 
human needs (Morals, pp. 94-9 5). This is the 
function of language and reason, and is not 
merely instrumental or subsequent to moral 
judgment, but is in an important sense at least 
partially constitutive of such judgments. 
But sociality is not a sufficient condition for 
the production of praiseworthy moral senti- 
ments. Hume does not claim that all misplaced 
moral judgments can be attributed to inade- 
quate socialization. He would not, I think, 
reject the Aristotelian observation that it is 
possible to be both a good citizen and a not so 
good human being, and he is surely neither a 
conventionalist nor a cultural relativist.14 The 
most striking evidence for this is his consistent 
criticism of the praise generally given to hero- 
ism, military glory, and courage in general: 
"Heroism, or military glory, is much admir'd by 
the generality of mankind. They consider it as 
the most sublime kind of merit. Men of cool 
reflexion are not so sanguine in their praises of 
it. The infinite confusions and disorder, which 
it has caus'd in the world, diminish much of its 
merit in their eyes" (Treatise, pp. 600-01). 
Similarly, those societies and cultures which 
seem to equate courage and virtue, like the 
Roman Republic and Homeric Greece (Morals, 
pp. 79-80), are subject to criticism on the 
grounds that their judgments of value are 
informed by a mistaken conception of real 
human needs and interests. At something like 
the other extreme, the "monkish virtues," such 
celibacy, self-denial, humility, and solitude, 
are contrary to reason and will everywhere be 
rejected by "men of sense" (Morals, p. 91). The 
14Nor is he guilty of the ethnocentrist view that all 
societies are fundamentally like England and France, 
in spite of some well-known passages such as the 
following from section 8 of the first Inquiry (Under- 
standing, p. 93): "Mankind are so much the same, in 
all times and places, that history informs us of nothing 
new or strange in this particular." See also Morals, p. 
33. The position that Hume was very sensitive to 
cultural differences as well as uniformities has been 
effectively set forth by Forbes (1975, pp. 102-21). 
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language of a culture is a necessary condition 
for the emergence of impartial moral judg- 
ments, but that language may reflect mistaken 
perceptions of human needs and the qualities 
which serve them and so issue in defective 
moral judgments or cultural values. 
Nor does Hume hold that moral controver- 
sies can be resolved by determining what moral 
views are held by most humans most of the 
time. Thus I think Harrison is mistaken in 
arguing that Hume believed that moral ques- 
tions can be settled by carefully observing what 
things people actually approve of (1976, p. 
123). Nonetheless, it is true that Hume often 
suggests that common moral opinion is the 
authoritative standard for resolving moral and 
political disputes: "The general opinion of 
mankind has some authority in all cases; but in 
this of morals 'tis perfectly infallible" (Treatise, 
p. 552; see also Treatise, p. 547n.). Similarly, in 
"Of The Original Contract" he says that "in all 
questions with regard to morals . . . there is 
really no other standard [other than an appeal 
to general opinion] by which any controversy 
can ever be decided" (Aiken, 1948, p . 371 ). At 
the same time, he states with equal clarity, 
frequency, and force that the basic standard or 
fact in terms of which values may be criticized 
is the substantive one of true human interest, 
rather than the procedural (and indeterminate) 
standard of what most people take that interest 
to be: "In all determinations of morality ... 
the question cannot, by any means, be decided 
with greater certainty than by ascertaining, on 
any side, the true interests of mankind" (Mor- 
als, pp. 12-13, see also Treatise, p. 562). 
As his discussion of courage and glory 
suggests, Hume is clearly aware that there may 
be disputes between the generality of mankind 
on the one hand and persons of sense and cool 
reflection on the other concerning which quali- 
ties should be called virtuous; and Hume leaves 
no doubt as to whose opinion should be 
favored in such controversies. His ambivalence 
about affirming that there is an objective moral 
standard whose existence does not depend 
upon consent or convention may well be caused 
by the fact that the human interest or the 
human good is a sort of final cause, and Hume's 
rejection of the intelligibility of teleological 
analysis is a central tenet of his empiricist 
epistemology (Treatise, p. 171). He sometimes 
attempts to resolve possible discrepancies be- 
tween real human interest and opinions con- 
cerning that interest by suggesting that the 
moral judgments of societies have progressively 
improved from uncultivated times to the pre- 
sent (Morals, p. 79; Forbes, 1975, pp. 87-89), 
and even, perhaps, by hinting that there is a 
preestablished harmony between our moral 
judgments and their objects similar to that 
between our causal judgments and the course of 
nature (An Inquiry Concerning Human Under- 
standing, p. 67; Beck, 1974, p. 225). But 
whatever the merit of these sketchy attempts at 
reconciling genuine interest and general opin- 
ion,15 they should not be allowed to obscure 
the fact that, for Hume, a great part of the task 
of the social scientist is to criticize ill-founded 
moral or political judgments and to suggest 
revisions in them wherever possible.1 6 
Conclusion 
A genuinely Humean social science would 
indeed be concerned with the analysis of 
certain kinds of facts, and not with exhorting 
its audience to be virtuous after one fashion or 
another: the social scientist is not a poet or a 
painter (Understanding, p. 15). Nor is it his 
function to deduce obligatory duties from 
supposedly eternal factual verities. But it would 
be a one-sided and thus a misleading account of 
Hume's social science to say that it simply 
treats values as phenomena to be described and 
explained by reference to the conditions which 
produce them. Rather, the work of the best 
social science will be to ascertain as clearly as 
possible those fundamental though contingent 
facts which define human needs and interests, 
and to examine, methodically and reflectively, 
the inferences from these facts which are 
implicit in judgments of value, and upon which 
such judgments are superimposed by our pas- 
sionate and sympathetic concern with the 
interests of mankind. Hume's social science is 
thus both factual and critical; its subject matter 
is composed of facts and inferences, but its 
conclusions are anything but value-neutral. 
Thus social science must be objectively critical 
in a way that is perfectly consistent with the 
is/ought distinction, and, ironically enough, 
critical in a way that a rigid and only super- 
ficially Humean separation of fact and value 
would exclude from the practice of social 
science. 
1 5They seem to be more aprioristic than the 
teleology whose rejection occasions them. 
16A brief set of such criticisms and proposals for 
revision is presented in Morals, pp. 12-14, where 
Hume argues that from the perspective of the true 
human interest, alms-giving, tyrannicide, and the 
liberality of princes are not virtues, and that luxury is 
no vice. 
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